Today, protocols considered part of PAKE are among the most common cryptographic primitives due to the PAKE family of protocols, as the distribution of the public key is necessary to perform high-level tasks, such as encryption and MAC calculation. When it comes to important agreements, the parties need the information that each of the parties would have. As is well known, the most common approach is currently the key to raspredeleraspredeleniyu preliminary exchange of public keys between parties, then send encrypted cryptographic keys. There are many in the accuracy of such protocols and similar ones that are normally based on the Diffie-Hellman protocol. However, all of these reports have a common fundamental error – they are faced with listening and offer no mechanism for authentication sites, let alone confirmation of the possession of the key to counter the imposition of traffic. Thus, if the certificate containing the public key of the second part has been intercepted in one way or another and replaced by its own intruder, if the type certificate of the recipient is not really known, listen without being spotted. Similarly, the applicability of the DE PAKE protocol family may be justified by the interactivity requirements when spreading the attackers` password, as opposed to absolute in the case of non-interactive authentication for conventional protocols based on the diffie-Hellman protocol. The first key methods of agreement successfully tested were the encrypted key exchange methods described in 1992 by Steven M. Bellovin and Michael Merritt. Although some of the early methods were flawed, the retained and expanded forms of EKE effectively reinforce a common password in a shared key, which can then be used for encrypting and/or authenticating messages. The first DE PAKE protocols were established in the work of Dr.

Bellare, D. Pointcheval and P. Rogaway (Eurocrypt 2000) and V. Boyko, P. MacKenzie and S. Patel (Eurocrypt 2000). These protocols proved safe in what is called the random oracle model (or even more powerful variants) and the first protocols, which proved safe according to standard assumptions were those of O. Goldreich and Y. Lindell (Crypto 2001), which serves as evidence of plausibility but is not effective, and J. Katz, R. Ostrovsky and M. Yung (Eurocrypt 2001), which are practical.

The key agreement, verified by the password, usually includes methods such as: The exchange of over-signed keys (PAKE) is the case where two or more parties based solely on their knowledge of a password set up a cryptographic key using a message exchange, so that an unauthorized party (which controls the communication channel but does not have the password) cannot participate in the method and is limited as much as possible by a waste force, the password.